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Introduction: The Recent Renaissance Of Acquaintance 
 
Thomas Raleigh, United Arab Emirates University 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 That there is a distinctively philosophical usage of the term ‘acquaintance’ is, of 
course, due primarily to the influence of Bertrand Russell and in particular to the distinction 
he famously drew between ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge by description’. 
These phrases soon became part of the philosophical lexicon. For example, the Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society twice featured symposia on the question ‘Is there knowledge by 
acquaintance?’, first in 19191 and then again in 19492. But then for much of the latter half of 
the 20th Century, as Russell’s influence waned, the notion of acquaintance came to be viewed 
with grave suspicion by many Anglophone philosophers. This was due in no small part to two 
hugely influential criticisms of a broadly Russellian picture3: Wittgenstein’s (1953) ‘private 
language argument’ and Sellars’ (1956) attack on the ‘Myth of the Given’. However, over the 
last decade or two, the notion of ‘acquaintance’ has swung markedly back into fashion in 
philosophy. The concept has, it seems, become respectable again. This volume gathers 
together 13 new essays, illustrating the wide range of topics in philosophy of mind, 
epistemology, philosophy of language and metaphysics, for which the concept of 
acquaintance is nowadays being utilised4. 
 As ever in philosophy, this term of philosophical art has been used with a variety of 
different meanings, for various different philosophical projects and purposes, by many 
different philosophers. But as a first-pass characterisation of acquaintance that I hope most 
parties could live with: acquaintance is a conscious mental relation that a subject can, 
supposedly, bear to particular items or features that is, somehow, fundamentally different 
from thinking a true thought about the item/feature in question. Rather than deploying 
concepts to form a mental state that is (merely) about something, when we are acquainted 
with something we are, in some sense, supposed to consciously confront that very thing itself. 
I suspect that any attempt to further clarify the contrast with conceptual thought, or the 
precise nature of the ‘conscious confrontation’, or to state the admissible categories of 
                                                      
1 Featuring G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, G. Dawes Hicks and Beatrice Edgell. 
2 Featuring the great legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart along with G. E. Hughes and J. N Findlay. 
3 Though neither Wittgenstein nor Sellars explicitly single out Russell as their target, it is clear that 
they are both criticizing a broadly Russellian, sense-data picture of experience. 
4 See Wishon & Linsky (eds.), 2015 for an excellent recent collection of essays focusing on Russell’s 
theory of knowledge by acquaintance at the time of Problems of Philosophy.	
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items/features that a subject can stand in the acquaintance relation to, is bound to step into 
contested territory. However, I would venture to suggest that acquaintance could 
illuminatingly be thought of as a way that the mind can supposedly be ‘directed’ at an object, 
which fundamentally contrasts with the notion of ‘intentionality’ that comes down to us from 
Brentano. For this latter, ‘quasi-relational’ notion does not require that the intentional object 
of a mental state be something that actually exists – e.g. I can think about my Fairy 
Godmother or about the present King of France – whereas acquaintance is supposed to be a 
genuine relation, so which could only obtain between a subject and something actual5.  
 The plan for this introductory chapter then will be to briefly consider the Russellian 
and pre-Russellian history of the concept, to consider a few questions and issues that the 
notion of acquaintance raises, and finally to survey some of the main philosophical topics for 
which ‘acquaintance’ has recently been invoked. 
 
2. Historical background 
 Generations of budding Anglophone philosophers will have gained their first 
exposure to the philosophical notion of acquaintance from Russell’s immensely popular book 
The Problems of Philosophy (1912). Russell had earlier presented a paper to the Aristotelian 
society in 1911, also entitled ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance & Knowledge by Description’, 
which contains much of the same material that would make up chapter 5 of what he famously 
called his ‘penny dreadful’ book. In fact, this distinction between two forms of knowledge 
already appears at the beginning and end of his famous 1905 paper ‘On Denoting’. And a 
mention of acquaintance occurs even earlier in his Principles of Mathematics (1903). It is 
plausible that Russell’s notion of acquaintance was influenced by his teacher James Ward’s 
notion of ‘presentation’, which was in turn arguably drawn from Kant’s notion of an 
‘intuition’ (‘Anschauung’)6.  
 But although it was Russell’s influence which undoubtedly enshrined the distinction 
as part of the standard terminology in ‘analytic’ philosophy, he was not the first English-
language philosopher to use the word ‘acquaintance’ in this way. Passmore (1957) informs us 
that John Grote, a moral philosopher and opponent of Utilitarianism, who held the 
Knightbridge chair in philosophy at Cambridge, distinguishes between ‘knowledge of 
                                                      
5 Even this much is controversial – D W Smith (1989, this volume) develops a notion of acquaintance 
in terms of intentionality, complete with modes of presentation. Mark Johnston (2004) holds we can, in 
hallucinatory episodes, be acquainted with uninstantiated universals. 
6 Ward, who was both a philosopher and a psychologist and advocated a form of panpsychism, held the 
Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic at Cambridge when Russell and Moore were students. See 
Hellie, 2009, for the suggestion that Ward was drawing on Kant.	
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acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge–about’ in his 1865 work Exploratorio Philosophica7. And 
William James, in his Principles of Psychology, from 1890, likewise uses the term 
‘acquaintance’ when drawing a philosophical distinction between different kinds of 
knowledge: 
 
‘I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an 
inch when I move my finger through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass; an effort 
of attention when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it; but about 
the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at 
all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to any one who has not already made it 
himself. I cannot describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, define to a 
child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is just what it is, and 
differs from other forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friends, Go to certain 
places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come. (James, 1890, 221) 
 
Of course, in many languages other than English, some such distinction is linguistically 
marked by the existence of two different words – e.g. ‘savoir’ and ‘connaitre’ in French, 
‘Kennen’ and ‘Wissen’ in German, ‘scire’ and ‘noscere’ in Latin – a linguistic fact that both 
Grote and Russell adduced in support of drawing a similar distinction in English. In Germany, 
at almost the same time as Grote, Helmholtz wrote in his 1868 paper ‘The Recent Progress of 
the Theory of Vision’ about a distinction between ‘das Kennen’ and ‘das Wissen’ – the 
former being ‘familiarity with phenomena’, the latter being “the knowledge of [phenomena] 
which can be communicated by speech”. Unlike Russell, who held Knowledge by 
Acquaintance to be more fundamental than Knowledge by Description, Helmholtz thought 
that das Wissen was the more important and fundamental form of knowledge. For though he 
allowed that das Kennen has ‘the highest degree of certainty and precision’, he thought, in 
line with the passage quoted above from James, that it could not be expressed in words, even 
to ourselves, and was thus unfit to be a basis for science. I cannot say whether William James 
would have read Grote’s work, but he certainly did read and admire Helmholtz. 
 Whatever the precise origins of the philosophical practice of using the English word 
‘acquaintance’ as we do, it seems immensely plausible that something like the same idea or 
concept of an acquaintance relation has cropped up throughout the history of philosophy 
under different labels. For example: Sosa (2003) suggests that the notion of 
‘direct’/’unmediated’ cognitive contact that we find in chapter 5 of Problems of Philosophy, 
                                                      
7 John Grote is also credited with coining the term ‘relativism’. He is not to be confused with his 
brother George Grote, also a philosopher, for whom the Grote chair in philosophy and logic at UCL 
was named. 
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bears a close resemblance to the views of Leibniz, who Russell was reading avidly at the 
time: 
 
“Our direct awareness of our own existence and of our thoughts provides us with the 
primary truths a posteriori, the primary truths of fact… there is no mediation between 
the understanding and its objects.” (Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, 
1765, Book IV ch.9) 
 
“We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, 
without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths.” 
(Russell, 1912, 46) 
 
 In the same vein, Descartes’ foundationalist project would seem to be naturally 
interpreted as being committed to some sort of especially secure and basic relation that one 
bears to one’s own conscious states – see Richard Fumerton’s essay this volume. Brewer 
(2011) points to Berkeley as an example of a philosopher whose theory of perceptual 
experience depends on something like a basic notion of conscious acquaintance with mind-
dependent objects – see also Stoneham (2002).  McLear (2016) and Gomes (2017) have both 
recently argued that Kant’s theory of perceptual experience is best interpreted in terms of an 
acquaintance relation with features in the external environment. Woodruff-Smith (1989 and 
this volume) employs the concept of acquaintance in his interpretation of Husserl – see also 
Jansen (2014). Gideon Makin (2000) suggests that Russell’s acquaintance is really just the 
very same relation that Frege called ‘grasping a sense’, though they disagreed over the objects 
of the relation. 
 No doubt, many other similar precedents of something like the concept of an 
acquaintance relation could be found throughout the history of philosophy – but that is, I 
hope, enough history for present purposes. 
 
3. Five Russellian Theses about Acquaintance 
 Russell’s distinction was explicitly epistemological, between two kinds of knowledge, 
but Russell’s treatment of the distinction was also intimately bound up with claims both about 
reference/language and also about the metaphysics of mind/consciousness. Russell, at least 
around the time of Problems of Philosophy, had a number of commitments that may strike 
acquaintance theorists nowadays as controversial or just plain wrong:  
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 (i) Russell, at the time of ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance & Knowledge by 
Description’ (KAKD) and Problems of Philosophy (PP), notoriously held that we are never 
acquainted with familiar physical items in our shared environment – though it is important to 
bear in mind that Russell insisted that sense-data are nevertheless mind-independent and 
ontologically distinct from the subject’s conscious awareness of them. 
 Concerning the admissible objects of the acquaintance relation, Russell held that we 
can only be acquainted with our current sense-data and mental states, plus some past sense-
data and past mental states in memory, some universals and possibly also ‘the self’.  
 
“We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses, and in 
introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense—thoughts, feelings, 
desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either 
of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not certain, that 
we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards 
things. 
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have 
acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to say, general ideas, such as 
whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so on… 
It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted are not included 
physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other people’s minds.” (Russell, 1912, 
51) 
 
However, Russell’s views on the possible objects of acquaintance had not always been so 
restrictive. As Peter Hylton points out, in their correspondence from around 1900-1902 both 
Russell and Moore thought that there was no restriction whatsoever on what we can be 
acquainted with (see Hylton, 1990, chapter 4). Similarly in the preface to his 1903 Principles 
of Mathematics, Russell holds that we can be acquainted with abstract logical/mathematical 
items: 
 
“The discussion of indefinable – which forms the chief part of philosophical logic – is 
the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in 
order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with 
redness or the taste of a pineapple.” (Russell, 1903, xv) 
 
Likewise, at the start of Chapter 3, Russell maintains that we can be acquainted with 
inferential relations: 
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“…it is plain that where we validly infer one proposition from another, we do so in 
virtue of a relation which holds between the two propositions whether we perceive it or 
not: the mind, in fact, is as purely receptive in inference as common sense supposes it to 
be in perception of sensible objects.” (Russell, 1903, p33) 
 
 (ii) Knowledge by Acquaintance is the more fundamental form of knowledge – all 
Knowledge by Description ultimately depends on Knowledge by Acquaintance. At the start 
of chapter 5 of problems of philosophy we are told:  
 
“All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon 
acquaintance as its foundation.” (Russell, 1912, 48) 
 
It seems clear that one might be attracted to the notion of acquaintance and want to assign it 
some kind of important epistemic role without going so far as to endorse Russell’s claim here 
that all knowledge depends on acquaintance. 
 (iii) We can only understand propositions wholly made up of constituents we are 
acquainted with. This principle seems to be first stated in print at the end of ‘On Denoting’: 
 
“…in every proposition which we can apprehend (i.e. not only in those  whose truth or 
falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are 
really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance.” (Russell, 1905, 492) 
 
Russell re-asserted this principle in many later works, including both KAKD and PP: 
 
“Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents 
with which we are acquainted.” (PP, p58) 
 
‘We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and 
not utter mere noise; and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with 
which we are acquainted.’ (PP58) 
 
‘The chief reason for supposing the principle true is that it seems scarcely possible to 
believe that we can make a judgement or entertain a supposition without knowing what 
it is that we are judging or supposing about.’ (KAKD 206) 
 
A re-formulated version of this principle was later influentially championed by Gareth Evans, 
in his “Varieties of Reference”, under the label ‘Russell’s Principle’ 
	 8	
 
“…in order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgement about an object, one 
must know which object is in question – one must know which object it is that one is 
thinking about. (I call this principle Russell’s Principle…)” (Evans, 1982, 65) 
 
 (iv) When we are acquainted with a present sense-datum, we are perfectly/completely 
acquainted with it; there is nothing we are missing, no ‘back side’ to a sense-datum.  
 
“The particular shade of colour that I am seeing may have many things said about it -- I 
may say that it is brown, that it is rather dark, and so on. But such statements, though 
they make me know truths about the colour, do not make me know the colour itself any 
better than I did before: so far a concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to 
knowledge of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it, 
and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible. Thus the sense-data 
which make up the appearance of my table are things with which I have acquaintance, 
things immediately known to me just as they are.” (Russell, 1912, 47) 
 
A corollary of this thesis is that, for Russell, there is no such thing as different ways or 
manners of being acquainted with a present sense-datum, there is just the one simple/brute 
acquaintance relation that can be borne contemporaneously to an item, which reveals it 
perfectly and entirely as it is in itself. The specific phenomenology of an experience then is 
determined entirely by the object side of the relation – the subject side cannot also contribute 
to the phenomenology by being acquainted in this or that specific way or manner. However, 
as Martin (this volume) points out, Russell did allow for different modes or manners of 
acquaintance insofar as he allowed that we can also be acquainted with a past-sense-datum – 
and here the object of acquaintance does not determine the phenomenology of the episode of 
remembering, rather it is the accompanying imagery which determines the phenomenology. 
 Later, in his Analysis of Mind (1921), Russell came to reject this fourth thesis8, for by 
that date he treats sense-data as identical with the ultimate physical constituents of reality 
described by physics and so allowed that sense-data can have further 
unperceived/unexperienced qualities and characteristics (and indeed can exist unperceived). 
 (v) Despite using the phrases ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’, ‘Knowledge by 
Description’, Russell thought that acquaintance is not just a means or source for getting 
knowledge of a distinctive kind. He held that being acquainted with something is already in 
itself a form of knowledge. To quote again from the passage at the start of chapter 5 of PP:  
                                                      
8 This move towards neutral monism arguably began even earlier, with his 1914 article ‘On the Nature 
of Acquaintance’. 
	 9	
 
“…so far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of truths 
about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it, and no further 
knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible.” (Russell, 1912, 47). 
 
Likewise in the previous chapter, Russell wrote: 
 
‘Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and 
something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind’s power of knowing 
things.” (Russell, 1912, 42, bold type added) 
 
See Sam Coleman’s essay in this volume for contemporary endorsement of this idea that 
acquaintance is itself a kind of Knowledge. However, I think that the way most theorists use 
the term ‘acquaintance’ these days is to denote a relation of direct conscious awareness that 
allows for a certain kind of knowledge or epistemic relation to an object but which does not in 
itself count as a state of knowledge. I.e. it is possible to be acquainted with O and yet fail to 
gain knowledge of any kind of O – one might be distracted or inattentive, one might be 
deluded or crazy, one could be infected with some reasonable doubt about one’s ability to 
form correct judgements.  
 
****** 
 
 More generally, I think its fair to say that most recent theorists who have appealed to 
acquaintance would reject at least one, and quite possibly all five of these Russellian theses. 
Certainly, none of these five theses are obviously entailed by the core characterisation of 
acquaintance I gave above in section 1 – viz. a relation of conscious awareness that is 
fundamentally distinct from thinking a true thought or forming an accurate judgement, in 
which the mind has some kind of unmediated confrontation with some portion of reality. 
 
4. Five Questions for Acquaintance Theorists 
 In this section, I briefly consider five important questions facing acquaintance 
theorists. 
 (i) Firstly a methodological question: should we approach the relation of 
acquaintance primarily as an epistemological topic – i.e. as a relation whose essential nature 
we define in terms of its being a special source of knowledge or justification? Or should we 
approach acquaintance primarily as a notion in the metaphysics of mind – i.e. as a relation 
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whose essential nature we define in psychological or phenomenological terms. In other 
words: should we take the alleged existence of a special kind of epistemic relation as the 
starting point for our philosophical investigations of acquaintance and only then go on to 
consider what kind of mental metaphysics or mechanisms that would be required to allow for 
that epistemic relation? Or do we start from the alleged existence of a special kind of 
conscious state or relation, posited initially on introspective or phenomenological 
grounds, and only latterly come to consider what epistemic or referential consequences might 
flow from such a mental state/relation? 
 Of course, there is no need to treat these two different kinds of approaches to 
acquaintance as mutually exclusive – after all, it is normal enough in philosophy that we 
approach an issue or concept from various directions at the same time. Nevertheless, I think it 
is worthwhile to register that there are these different starting points for thinking about 
acquaintance and that different acquaintance theorists may have taken one or other route. For 
example: in his influential work on acquaintance, John Campbell seems to be primarily 
motivated by epistemological and referential concerns and this has led him to champion a 
relational model of experience on which the mind is acquainted with external features. In 
contrast, M. G. F. Martin seems to be motivated primarily by phenomenological 
considerations to endorse a form of naïve-realism and he has been notably cautious about the 
epistemological benefits, if any, that might result from adopting this acquaintance-based 
model. 
 Or to take another example, a number of discussions of acquaintance in the literature 
on singular thought/reference take their starting point to be the claim that there is some sort of 
special relation one must have to an item in order to think a singular thought about it (or to 
understand a singular term which refers to it) – with some theorists arguing for such a 
requirement and others against it. The precise nature of the mental states or mechanisms 
required for this relation is then a secondary question. It is not uncommon to read 
philosophers arguing that there must be some such requirement, but who are happy to leave 
its exact nature open at least for the time being. For example, Kent Bach writes:  
 
‘A de re representation of a material object must be a percept or derive from a percept, 
either one’s own or someone else’s.’ (Bach, 2010, 55) 
 
But how much of an object has to be perceived? is it ok to have only seen a photo of it? What 
about on TV? What if the object is covered under a thin blanket but you can make out its 
rough shape and contours? Etc etc. Bach confesses he doesn’t really know – his hunch is to be 
reasonably inclusive, but he draws a line at merely hearing a sound produced by the object. 
But he’s also prepared to allow that the extent of singular thought is much more limited than 
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his intuitions suggest (see Bach 2010, 57-58). Its clear that Bach’s real interests here do not 
lie in the precise nature of the perceptual link that allows for singular thought so much as just 
establishing that there is some such constraint. 
 (ii) Secondly: is the acquaintance relation non-representational? Or is being 
acquainted with an object just a distinctive kind – e.g. a non-conceptual or somehow sensory 
kind – of representational state?  
 In general, those who are writing about acquaintance in the context of the traditional 
problem of perception have assumed that it is a non-representational relation that stands in 
opposition to the representational family of theories9. But when it comes to the literature on 
the hard problem of consciousness this opposition between acquaintance and representation 
become less clear. On the one hand Levine (2007) and Chalmers (2004, 2007) both hold that 
we must acknowledge some kind of acquaintance relation to our own phenomenal 
properties/features, but that this cannot be explained by appeal to a special kind of 
phenomenal concept – i.e. to a special kind of representational vehicle. On the other hand, 
Balog (2012) thinks that a special kind of concept – the phenomenal kind, which uses itself to 
refer to itself – explains what acquaintance is. Being acquainted here then is treated as a 
special sensory kind of conceptual representation. Paul Churchland (1989), who asserts that 
“What Mary is missing is some form of ‘knowledge by acquaintance’” (Churchland, 1989, 
71) provides a neuro-scientific story on which ‘acquaintance’ is cashed out as a ‘distributed 
representation that is not remotely propositional or discursive’. Likewise, Bigelow & 
Pargetter (1990, 2006), in providing a physicalist response to Jackson’s Mary, appeal to 
acquaintance, which they understand in terms of a special kind of belief-representation. Earl 
Conee, in yet another paper arguing that acquaintance holds the key to answering Jackson’s 
Knowledge argument, is explicitly agnostic as to whether acquaintance is representational or 
not: 
 
“Perhaps awareness is experiential pure and unmediated; perhaps awareness of an 
experienced quality is mediated by some particularly transparent sensory form of 
representation. What matters for the present account is that experiencing a quality is the 
most direct way to apprehend the quality. That much seems beyond reasonable doubt.” 
(Conee, 1994, 145) 
 
                                                      
9 There are by now various hybrid theories in the literature that combine relational and representational 
elements – e.g. Kennedy (2013), Logue (2014), Nanay (2016), Langsam (2011). But these are hybrid 
theories precisely insofar as they combine a non-representational relation of acquaintance with the 
external world together with the notion of representational content. Thus these hybrid theorists are still 
treating acquaintance as a non-representational relation, even if it is somehow combined into a larger 
state with a different representational component. See also Bengson et al (2011) for a ‘dual component’ 
theory of experience that also combines relational and representational elements. 
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 For many epistemologists the point of appealing to an acquaintance relation is to 
account for non-inferential justification of beliefs, or for a special kind of foundational 
epistemic security – which in itself does not obviously require one to take a stand on whether 
the relation essentially involves representational content. A number of recent defenders of 
traditional foundationalist epistemologies – e.g. Fumerton (1995, this volume), Bonjour 
(2003) Fales (1996), all maintain that an episode of acquaintance can involve propositional 
content in the following way10. In order to generate justification for a belief, one needs to be 
acquainted not only with a fact but also with: (i) a corresponding proposition (about that fact), 
and, (ii) the relation of correspondence that obtains between the fact and the proposition.    
However, it is important to distinguish the idea that the object of the acquaintance relation is 
something representational – such as a thought or propositional content from the idea that the 
acquaintance relation itself is a form of representation. 
 (iii) Thirdly, what sort of things are we (supposedly) acquainted with? What are the 
possible objects of acquaintance? 
 We have already briefly discussed Russell’s views on the possible objects of 
acquaintance in section 3, above. It is clear enough that any appeal to (or argument against) 
some notion of acquaintance needs to consider some of the following sorts of questions: Are 
we supposed to be acquainted with mind-independent features out in the environment? Or are 
we only ever acquainted with mental or inner features? Or are we perhaps sometimes 
acquainted with the outer, sometimes with the inner? Or are we sometimes acquainted with 
both kinds of features in a single experience? E.g. Wishon (2012) argues that in perception 
we are simultaneously acquainted with external objects and also with sensory properties of 
our on experience. Should we treat the objects of acquaintance for each of the sense-
modalities along the same lines, or might it be that, say, vision acquaints us with external 
features whilst, say, taste or smell acquaint us with something inner? Are we acquainted with 
our own consciousness? Or our own self? E.g. Duncan (2015) argues that we are acquainted 
with ourselves. Can we be acquainted with acquaintance itself? (Fales (1996) suggests that we 
can be acquainted with given-ness.) 
 As well as the inner vs outer axis, we can also ask about the metaphysical structure of 
whatever it is we are acquainted with: Are we acquainted with something (whether inner or 
outer) like a fact or state of affairs? E.g. Fumerton (1995) and Bonjour (2003) both endorse 
the idea that we can be acquainted not only with a fact and with a thought but also with the 
                                                      10	Notice, the idea is that acquaintance can inolve propositional content, not that it always or 
essentially does so. E.g. Fumerton explicitly allows that one can be acquainted with a fact in a way that 
does not involve propositional content. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Oxford University 
Press for helpful discussion on this point.	
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‘fit’ between the fact and the thought. Or are we acquainted just with the particulars 
themselves? Or can we also be acquainted with token property instances? 
 Assuming we are somehow or other acquainted with properties, we are obviously 
bound to ask which properties we can be acquainted with in experience – just as 
representational theorists are obliged to answer a parallel question as to which properties can 
be represented in experience. For example: are we only visually acquainted with 2-d shape 
and colour properties, or can we also be acquainted with other properties – e.g. 3-dimensional 
shape and depth, perhaps temporal properties, perhaps relations such as identity over time, 
causation, meaning properties, perhaps the emotions of other people, etc. And if we think the 
objects of acquaintance are always ‘inner’, we then face the question of whether these inner 
items can possess the same properties of shape and colour that we standardly ascribe to 
environmental items, or whether they instead possess distinct phenomenal properties –
 shape*, colour*. 
 (iv) Fourthly, another important issue to consider is whether it is possible to stand in 
multiple different acquaintance relations to the one same object of acquaintance  – i.e. can 
there be different ways or modes or manners of being acquainted with the very same thing? 
 We have already seen Russell in PP insist that when one is acquainted with a sense-
datum, one is perfectly acquainted with it – there is, as it were, no back side or hidden aspect 
to a sense-datum. And it seems that both Moore and Russell around this time held that 
whenever there is a phenomenological difference between two experiences this is always to 
be accounted for by a difference in the object side of the relation – see for example Moore’s 
(1903) famous discussion of the apparent diaphaneity of experience. (However, it should be 
bourn in mind that Moore eventually concluded that one can in fact attend to the act of 
consciousness itself, as opposed to the object, though it requires a rather special act of 
attention. It should also be remembered that whilst Russell held there was only one way to be 
acquainted with a present sense-datum, he did allow that one could also be acquainted with it 
in a different way, via memory, once the sense-datum was past  – see M G F Martin’s essay 
in this volume.) 
 I think this understanding of the acquaintance relation lives on in the literature on 
consciousness. For example: Chalmers (1996, 2007), Nida-Rumelin (2007), Goff (2011, 
2015) all claim that when one is acquainted with a phenomenal property – such as pain or 
red-looking-ness – one is thereby provided with knowledge of the essence of that property (or 
at least part of the essence). (Compare Bill Brewer’s essay in this volume, in which he 
defends the thesis of ‘revelation’; idea that conscious acquaintance with a property can 
provide knowledge of the nature of that property.) 
 However, in the literature on perception and naïve-realism we find John Campbell 
(2002, 2007) arguing that acquaintance is a 3-place relation, whose relata include not just the 
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subject and the object but also a ‘viewpoint’. (see also Kennedy (2007)). Similarly Bill Fish 
(2009) allows that the nature and functioning of the subject’s visual system can contribute to 
the phenomenology of conscious acquaintance. More generally, if an acquaintance theorist 
holds that we can be acquainted with environmental features, they are going to have to deal 
with perceptual relativity, the changing appearances of an unchanging environmental object. 
And so then it seems one has to allow for different ways or manners of being acquainted with 
the same one item (see Raleigh (forthcoming) for further discussion of this point.) 
 One issue that then arises if one does allow for different manners or modes of 
acquaintance is the following: how do these modes of acquaintance differ from the orthodox 
representational notion of a mode of presentation or Fregean sense? You might worry here 
that once different modes of acquaintance are allowed we begin to lose the contrast between 
an acquaintance theory and a representational account of experience that treats the alleged 
contents of experience along Fregean lines. For now on both stories the perceptual experience 
is directed at an external object or scene, but this external target is presented to the subject via 
a distinctive mode or manner of presentation. A first thought here might be that 
representational modes of presentation do not require any actual existing object that the 
subject is presented with – the object can be merely intentional. Whereas acquaintance is 
genuine relation that requires both relata to actually exist for the relation to be instantiated. 
However, if you think, as McDowell (1982) and Evans (1982) long ago urged, that there can 
be special object-dependent, non-descriptive singular modes of presentation, then this 
dimension of contrast may be lost. 
 Another obvious way to draw a contrast between the two approaches is to insist that 
manners/modes of acquaintance are not assessable as true or false, whereas Fregean modes of 
presentation are. However, not all representational theorists think of the content of experience 
as having truth conditions – e.g. Tim Crane (2009) insists that experiential content can be 
accurate/inaccurate but not true/false, since it is not propositional. And likewise, not all naïve-
realists/acquaintance theorists deny that experiences are assessable as true/false – it is 
common to read people with naïve-realist sympathies, e.g. Martin (2002, 2004), continuing to 
use the term ‘veridical’ as applied to experience itself. 
 A different possible dimension of contrast here is that on the orthodox Fregean 
account, sense determines reference – that is for any mode of presentation there is a unique 
(though possibly non-existent) intentional object. So we never find the same mode of 
presentation presenting different referents on different occasions (though perhaps the same 
mode of presentation can sometimes succeed in referring and sometimes fail). Whereas an 
acquaintance theorist can, and I think should, allow that a manner/mode of acquaintance –
 comprising the various factors both external and internal that contribute to the 
phenomenology of the experience, e.g. perspective, lighting, condition of one’s eyes etc – can 
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be held constant over different occasions and yet acquaint the subject with numerically 
different items. If I swap one visually indistinguishable item for another and keep the viewing 
conditions identical, the mode or manner of acquaintance remains the same though the object 
of acquaintance has changed. Of course this dimension of contrast would also be lost if the 
representational theorist is prepared to abandon the orthodox Fregean doctrine that sense 
determines reference. 
 Mark Johnston (2011), whilst arguing in favour of a relational view of perception, 
briefly discusses the contrast with Fregean senses: 
 
‘In an ASE [attentive sensory episode] the target is presented in a certain manner, and 
the target may or may not conform to its manner of presentation. Hence these manners 
of presentation are not Fregean senses, which determine something as their referent 
when and only when the referent satisfies the sense. A target can be presented in an 
ASE in an illusory fashion and yet the ASE may thereby allow its subject to makes his 
or her first demonstrative reference to the target, and so have the target as a topic of 
thought and talk.’ (Johnston, 2011, 173) 
 ‘The best model of the relation between manner of presentation and target in an ASE is 
given by ‘the theory of appearing’ where the manner of presentation just is the target 
presenting-in-a-certain-manner.’ (ibid. 174) 
 
In contrast, Levine (2001) assimilates acquaintance to a special kind of mode of presentation  
– i.e. a phenomenal concept: 
 
‘our conception, or mode of presentation of property like redness is substantive and 
determinate in a way that the modes of presentation of other sorts properties are not. 
When I think of what it is to be reddish, the reddishness itself is somehow included in 
the thought; its present to me. This is what I mean by saying it has a ‘substantive’ mode 
of presentation. In fact, it seems the right way to look at it is that reddishness itself is 
serving as its own mode of presentation. By saying that the conception is ‘determinate’, 
I mean that reddishness presents itself as a specific quality, identifiable in its own right, 
not merely by its relation to other qualities. 
……the mode of presentation of cathood [in contrast] lacks substance and determinacy.’ 
(Levine, 2001, 8) 
 
And in a footnote he adds: 
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‘The contrast I’m after between modes of presentation of qualitative properties and 
other properties (or objects) is perhaps captured in Russell’s (1959) distinction between 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge by description’. We are acquainted with 
the contents of experience, but not with anything else.’ (ibid.,179 endnote 8) 
 
 (v) Finally, can acquaintance be further analysed and/or naturalized? 
 It is not uncommon to hear the relation of acquaintance being described as ‘brute’ or 
‘simple’ – suggesting that in some sense it resists further illuminating analysis. For example, 
here is Evan Fales: 
 
‘the quality of being given is itself given; and moreover, that is itself something simple, 
not analysable into constituents, in the way in which the content of what is given on a 
particular occasion might be. As sentient beings, we apprehend, directly and 
immediately, what it is to be directly and immediately confronted by a perceptual 
experience… 
If someone did not already have acquaintance with given-ness, it would be quite futile 
to instruct him either by employing ostension or by saying such things as that the given 
is itself given, just as it would be futile to direct the blind person to color sensations by 
saying that they are visually sensed.’ (Fales, 1996, 147-8) 
 
Likewise Richard Fumerton writes that Acquaintance: 
 
“cannot be informatively subsumed under a genus, and…cannot be analyzed into any 
less problematic concepts” (Fumerton, 1995, 76) 
 
Of course, acquaintance is not meant to be simple or brute in the sense that fundamental 
particles or forces might be said to be simple or brute. I take it that the idea here is that the 
state or relation of being consciously acquainted with something cannot be further analysed or 
explained as being constituted by other, simpler conscious or personal level mental acts or 
states. And so I assume that neither Fumerton nor Fales mean to be suggesting here that the 
supposed unanalysability or ineffability of acquaintance shows that the relation could not in 
fact supervene on purely physical facts. Likewise, naïve-realist acquaintance theorists, will 
presumably not want to deny that an episode of S being acquainted with O in some way 
supervenes on or is constituted by some complex extended physical process of interaction, a 
causal chain running from O to S, reflected light, sub-personal unconscious events in the 
retina and brain, etc.  
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 This might naturally lead one to wonder as to whether some kind of naturalising 
project could or should be pursued along roughly the same lines as the various attempts to 
naturalise representational content. I.e. just as many theorists have attempted to state the 
conditions under which some physical or neural mechanism represents something, in terms 
that do not take for granted any kind of representational notion – meaning, truth, reference 
etc, so one might attempt to state the conditions under which a subject is acquainted with 
something in temrs that do not take for granted anything like consciousness – e.g. attention, or 
wake-fulness or ‘presence to mind’ etc. In the context of naïve-realist or relational version of 
acquaintance, one might look towards Enactive/Embodied/Extended approaches in cognitive 
science as natural allies when trying to give a naturalistic account of conscious acquaitnanc 
with one’s surroundings. And indeed Alva Noe has described his own Enactivist position as 
being ‘as naïve-realist as one could hope to be’ (Noe, 2008, 703). 
 Notice also that even if we accept that the state or relation of being acquainted cannot 
be analysed into personal level constituents, nor that it can currently be given a reductive, 
naturlised account, that does not mean that nothing interesting or illuminating can be said 
about it. Compare: Williamson (2000) famously argued that Knowledge is not analysable and 
should be taken as an epistemological primitive – but that does not mean that nothing 
interesting can be said about it, nor that we cannot specify necessary or sufficient conditions 
for knowledge. Indeed Williamson himself holds that S knows that p iff S’s evidence includes 
the proposition p. And so it might be likewise for acquaintance – even if it is not analysable 
or reducible into simpler components, we might still be able to say various interesting or 
illuminating things about it. 
 
5. Some Recent Acquaintance-Based Theorising 
 In this final section, I briefly survey some of the main uses to which the notion of 
acquaintance has been put in the recent literature – including the essays in the present volume. 
 
5.1 Acquaintance & Phenomenal Properties 
 On Russell’s original picture, we are acquainted with sense-data, which were 
supposed on the one hand to be distinct from familiar objects such as tables and chairs, but on 
the other hand were also supposed to be mind-independent and ontologically distinct from the 
subject’s conscious awareness of them. If we abandon this Russellian notion of sense-data, 
we might then think of acquaintance as a conscious relation to familiar objects and features in 
the external environment, or we might think of acquaintance as a relation that one bears to 
states or features of one’s own mind. A number of philosophers writing on the so-called 
‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’, and in particular in the recent literature on phenomenal 
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Concepts, have had recourse to this latter ‘internalist’ conception of acquaintance. It is 
noteworthy that both physicalists and non-physicalists have made appeals to acquaintance in 
this regard. 
 In the literature initially generated by Frank Jackson’s (1982) celebrated “Mary” 
example, there were some theorists – e.g. Bigelow & Pargetter (1990, 2006), Conee (2004) – 
who suggested that what Mary gains when she leaves her Black and White environment is 
Knowledge-by-Acquaintance of a phenomenal quality that she previously knew about only by 
description. This acquaintance-based response to Jackson’s ‘Knowledge Argument’ can thus 
be grouped alongside Lewis’ (1988) & Nemirov’s (1980, 1990) claim that Mary gains a new 
ability – in both cases the form of the response is to allow that Mary does indeed learn 
something but to deny that the knowledge in question is propositional knowledge of a fact. 
And so the physicalist thesis that all facts are physical facts can supposedly be saved. More 
recently, Michael Tye (2009) also endorsed an acquaintance-based response to the knowledge 
argument – though in Tye & Grzankowski’s contribution to the present volume, they argue 
that acquaintance is only part of the solution. Tye & Grzankowski hold that when Mary first 
experiences red she does indeed gain non-propositional knowledge by acquaintance of a 
simple sensible quality, but they point out that this non-propositional state cannot in itself 
suffice for Mary’s epistemic progress. According to Tye & Grzankowski, knowledge of what 
it is like to experience red (an instance of knowledge-wh) is propositional knowledge. Tye & 
Grzankowski go on to argue that although non-propositional acquaintance cannot itself 
constitute a propositional answer to the question ‘what is it like to experience red?’, 
nevertheless acquaintance is vital to understanding Mary’s epistemic gain. Acquaintance with 
the sensible quality in question is that upon which Mary bases her phenomenal knowledge. In 
the context of the knowledge argument, a propositional answer to ‘what is like to experience 
red?’ must be based in one’s own acquaintance in order to qualify as an appropriate answer. 
This position stands in contrast to the phenomenal concept strategy, a strategy that might seek 
to situate acquaintance in relation to the possession conditions of certain concepts. Since Tye 
& Grzankowski do not believe that there are any phenomenal concepts, they argue that their 
“epistemic basing” approach is the preferred way to get Mary’s new acquaintance with a 
color into the story. 
 One obvious worry about the strategy of appealing to acquaintance as a way of 
defending physicalism, is that this special relation of acquaintance that we can allegedly bear 
to our own conscious states is, prima facie, just as mysterious and difficult to explain for a 
physicalist as the ‘qualia’ of phenomenal red-ness with which we started. E.g. Gertler (1999) 
argues that it is only property dualists, and not physicalists, who can give a story as to how we 
can have this special form of access – acquaintance – with qualia. 
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 Bigelow & Pargetter’s acquaintance-based response to Mary allows that she would 
come to have a new belief as a result of being acquainted with phenomenal red-ness. By 
individuating beliefs in this fine-grained way, Bigelow & Pargetter’s acquaintance-based 
theory can be seen as presaging the later literature focusing on the ‘phenomenal concept 
strategy’ response to Mary. Phenomenal concepts are meant to be a special way of thinking 
about a phenomenal property that one can typically only acquire by having a conscious 
experience featuring that very property – i.e. by being acquainted with the very property that 
the concept is about. A defender of physicalism can then appeal to this special phenomenal 
kind of concept in explanation of how Mary can gain new propositional knowledge of the 
same old physical facts that she already knew couched in terms of neuro-scientific concepts.
 This strategy relies then on slicing the propositional contents of knowledge-states 
more finely than facts. A physicalist must insist that phenomenal properties are physical 
properties and that facts about what it is like to experience these phenomenal properties are 
just physical facts. The idea then is that Mary, who by hypothesis already knows all the 
physical facts, can gain a new phenomenal concept when she actually experiences red for the 
first time – and so she can re-conceptualize a physical fact about the brain using this new 
phenomenal concept and thus gain new propositional knowledge of the same old fact. Of 
course, for this appeal to phenomenal concepts to count as a physicalist strategy, one must be 
able to give a purely physical account of what it is to acquire and deploy a phenomenal 
concept. That is, one must be able to give an account of what it is to think of a putatively 
neural property in a special, distinctively sensory way that does not just take for granted the 
existence of a special phenomenal aspect to the property.  
 Many such theories, which attempt to spell out what is distinctive and special about 
phenomenal concepts in physicalistically respectable terms, have been offered in the 
literature. E.g. Lycan (1996), Perry (2001) and Ismael (2007) appeal to the idea that 
phenomenal concepts are a kind of indexical or demonstrative concept; Loar (1990/1997) and 
Levin (2007) claim that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts; Hawthorne (2002) 
and Braddon-Mitchell (2003) suggest that phenomenal concepts are conditional concepts. 
One important suggestion has been that phenomenal concepts are quotational concepts, which 
use a conscious state or property as part of the phenomenal concept whose referent is that 
very state or property – just as the device of quotation can embed a word as part of a larger 
meta-linguistic term that refers to that very word, e.g. “chair” refers to the English word: 
chair and is also partly constituted by it. Likewise then, the idea is that a token phenomenal 
concept uses (and is partly constituted by) a token phenomenal property in order to refer to 
that very property. This kind of approach has been pursued by Papineau (1993, 2002, 2007), 
Balog (1999, 2012) and Melnyk (2002). Balog in particular has claimed that a quotational 
account of phenomenal concepts can give a physicalist explanation of our acquaintance with 
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phenomenal properties – i.e. how phenomenal concepts provide/involve a grasp of the 
phenomenal property’s essential phenomenal nature. Sam Coleman’s essay in this volume 
also deploys the notion of quotation in order to give an explanation of our acquaintance with 
phenomenal properties that is consistent with physicalism. (Though Coleman distinguishes 
his Quotational Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness from Quotational theories of 
phenomenal concepts.) 
 In contrast, a number of anti-physicalist theorists have claimed that recognising a 
relation of conscious acquaintance is mandatory for a good account of consciousness and of 
our especially intimate cognitive contact with it’s manifest phenomenal nature, but that 
recognising such a relation is a problem for physicalism. Levine (2007) argued that the 
phenomenal concept strategy as pursued in strictly physicalist terms, fails to account for the 
special direct acquaintance we have with the phenomenal property. (Levine does not self-
identify as an anti-physicalist, but he does think that the need to account for conscious 
acquaintance is a serious objection against physicalism.) See White 2007, Chalmers 2007 and 
Nida-Rumelin (2007) for related criticisms of the phenomenal concept strategy. In his 
contribution to the present volume, Joseph Levine argues that whilst a non-naturalistic 
theory of conscious acquaintance is required to explain the especially direct and intimate 
cognitive relation we have to our own consciousness, such a non-naturalistic theory cannot 
explain some of the other epistemological and semantic roles of experience that a naturalistic 
theory of acquaintance is well-placed to explain. 
 When theorising about the metaphysics of consciousness, one might naturally try to 
start from uncontroversial claims about the manifest phenomenal appearance of experience to 
the conscious subject’s reflective point of view. But what seems uncontroversial and manifest 
to some philosophers may not seem nearly so obvious to others! For example, H. H. Price (in 
an oft-quoted passage) wrote: 
 
“When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato 
that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is 
any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; 
perhaps I am even the victim of some hallucination. One thing however that I cannot 
doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out 
from a background of other colour-patches… that something is red and round then and 
there I cannot doubt…(Price, 1932, p.3) 
 
But what seemed indubitable to Price – the existence of some actual red, round particular –
 has been denied by many adverbial and representational theorists. Likewise, a number of 
representational theorists have claimed that the representational nature of perceptual 
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experience is obvious or manifest – e.g. Byrne (2001) Siegel (2010) Horgan & Tienson 
(2002) – though this will of course be disputed by their non-representational oppponents. 
 In his contribution to this volume M. G. F. Martin, considers whether there can be 
a description of the manifest subjective ‘facts of appearance’, which remains entirely neutral 
between the main rival competing metaphysical accounts of what grounds or determines those 
subjective facts – and in particular which remains neutral between representational vs. non-
representational theories. Martin starts his essay by considering a disagreement between 
different two sense-data theorists – Russell on the one hand, and John Foster on the other – 
concerning how to explain the phenomenal difference between episodes of sensory perception 
and episodes of sensory imagination and recollection. Whereas Russell sought to explain both 
perceptual experiences and conscious imagery in terms of acquaintance with sense-data, 
Foster proposed a ‘two-level’ account on which a relation of acquaintance with sense-data –
 as occurs in perceptual experience – is the more basic explanatory level, and then conscious 
imagining and remembering are to be explained in terms of a representation of the more basic 
relational sensory type of episode. An important moral that Martin draws from this debate is 
that Foster was correct to think that conscious episodes of imagining and remembering are 
manifestly representational in a way that episodes of perceptual experience are not. And thus, 
Martin argues, we should reject the idea that there can be description of the subjective facts 
which remains neutral between representational and non-representational accounts of the 
metaphysical grounds of those facts. 
 
5.2 Acquaintance & Perception 
 The past couple of decades have witnessed a surge of interest in ‘Naïve-Realist’ or 
‘Relational’ theories of perceptual experience, according to which we can be consciously 
acquainted with items and features in the external environment. Theorists who explicitly use 
the term ‘acquaintance’ in this Naïve-realist context include: Campbell (2009), Fish (2009), 
Hellie (2010), Brewer (2011), Soteriou (2013). But even when the term ‘acquaintance’ is not 
used – as in, for example, Travis (2004) Putnam (1999), Logue (2012a), Martin (2002, 2004), 
the relation of direct conscious awareness that is theorised to hold between subject and 
external object is very plausibly thought of as a variety of acquaintance relation. 
 This surge of interest in Naïve-realism has surely been in large part due to the 
development of new ‘disjunctivist’ strategies for responding to the argument from 
hallucination – a strategy that is standardly credited first to Hinton (1967, 1973) and then 
developed by Snowden (1980, 1990) and McDowell (1982, 1994) and receives its state of the 
art defence in the work of M. G. F. Martin (2004, 2006) 
 In its simplest form, the argument from hallucination moves from 2 premises to the 
conclusion that Naïve-realism is false: 
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(1) Hallucinations are conscious episodes that are not essentially relational. 
(2) (Common Kind Assumption): Hallucinations and perceptual experiences are the 
same essential kind of conscious episodes. 
Therefore: 
(3) Perceptual experiences are conscious episodes that are not essentially relational. 
 
The first premise has generally gone uncontested (though see Raleigh, 2014, Ali 2016; see 
also Johnston (2004) for the claim that in a hallucination one is consciously related to an un-
instantiated universal), as it plausibly seems to simply fall out from the definition of a 
hallucination. The disjunctivist strategy is to deny (2), the common kind assumption, and to 
insist instead that hallucinations and perceptions, even when ‘subjectively indiscriminable’ 
and/or involving the same neural processes, are fundamentally different kinds of experience. 
And so a class of subjectively indiscriminable experiences is said to form a (merely) 
disjunctive kind – e.g. an experience as of a yellow lemon is either a perception of a yellow 
lemon or a hallucinatory episode that the subject cannot introspectively distinguish from a 
perception of yellow lemon. But there is, according to disjunctivists, no 
substantial/fundamental common conscious nature, other than this subjective 
indiscriminability, that is shared by both disjuncts – though there may be merely neurological 
similarities.  
 Against disjunctivism, Robinson (1985, 1994) emphasises the possibility that the 
neural causes/processes involved in both a perception and a subjectively indiscriminable 
hallucination might be exactly the same. The problem for a disjunctivist then is that once it is 
admitted that this neural event/process suffices by itself to give rise to the hallucinatory 
experience and to explain its phenomenology, it seems that in the perceptual case also the 
presence of this same neural event/process should likewise suffice to give rise to an 
experience of the same type as in the hallucinatory case. Which would seem to ‘screen-off’ 
the alleged acquaintance relation to the external scene from doing explanatory work vis-à-vis 
the phenomenology of the perceptual experience. 
 In response, Martin (2004, 2006) argues that the disjunctivist should hold that there is 
nothing more to the conscious phenomenal nature of a causally-matching hallucination than 
its indiscriminability from some perceptual experience – i.e. it is this negative epistemic 
condition which explains the phenomenal nature of the hallucination rather than vice-versa. 
Martin holds that this ‘negative epistemic’ characterisation of the hallucinatory case avoids 
the screening-off worry as such a characterisation is essentially parasitic upon the 
phenomenal nature of the perceptual case – and so the alleged naïve-realist acquaintance 
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relation with external features can still have a constitutive explanatory role vis-à-vis the 
phenomenology of the perceptual experience11. 
 Just as hallucinations pose a potential threat to the claim that in perceptual experience 
we can be acquainted with the external environment, so likewise dreams – to the extent that 
they too are supposed to be episodes with a similarly sensory phenomenal character – might 
also be thought to potentially undermine ‘naïve-realist’ positions. Tom Stoneham’s essay in 
this volume considers how a naïve-realist, acquaintance theorist should try to deal with 
dreams. One possibility would be to adopt a form of disjunctivism – which whilst allowing 
that dreams have some kind of phenomenal character, would insist that it is of a 
fundamentally different kind to the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Stoneham 
considers this disjunctivist response to be viable but ‘requiring considerable confidence with 
respect to metaphysics’ and so ‘a comparative weakness of the [naïve-realist] account’. His 
essay thus explores an alternative non-disjunctive strategy when it comes dreams: deny that 
dreams have phenomenal character at all. (Compare: Fish 2009 and Logue 2012b both make 
parallel denials that hallucinations really have genuine sensory phenomenal character.) Whilst 
this will presumably strike many readers as a counter-intuitive and radical proposal, 
Stoneham argues that we lack any theory-neutral evidence that dreams really do possess 
phenomenal character as opposed to a rival view that we confabulate reports and construct 
false memories of dream phenomenology as a result of cultural influence and social pressures 
to conform. And so, if one antecedently thought that acquaintance provides the best account 
of normal perceptual experience, it would be legitimate to prefer the non-phenomenal theory 
of dreams on the basis that it fits with this best account of perception. 
 As well as the various (disjunctivist or non-disjunctivist) strategies for defending the 
view against arguments from illusion, hallucination or dreams, there are various positive 
motivations for the ‘naïve-realist’ idea that we can be directly acquainted with external 
features. In sections 5.3 and 5.4 below we will consider some of the epistemic and referential 
virtues that such a view has been alleged to possess. But another important kind of motivation 
is phenomenological – i.e. the idea that we need to appeal to acquaintance with external 
features in order to do justice to the manifest phenomenology of experience. For example, in 
a series of important and influential papers, M. G. F. Martin (1997, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006) 
has maintained that a naïve-realist theory, according to which we can be directly acquainted 
with familiar mind-independent objects and features in our surroundings, provides the best 
articulation of how perceptual experience seems to first-personal reflection. Martin (2002) has 
                                                      
11 See Fish (2009) for another presentation of the ‘negative epistemic’ account of 
hallucinations. See Sturgeon (1998), Siegel (2004, 2008), Pautz (2011) for criticism of the 
negative epistemic account. 	
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also argued that naïve-realism also provides the best account of the phenomenology of 
sensory imagining, such as visualising. 
 Another important (and perhaps somewhat unjustly neglected) example of 
acquaintance-based theorising about perception, in which the motivation for appealing to 
acquaintance is phenomenological, is D. W. Smith’s 1989 book ‘The Circle of Acquaintance’. 
In his contribution to the present volume, Smith endorses the idea that in perception we 
can be directly acquainted with familiar features in our external environment, but he 
emphasises that in our everyday actions we can also gain a kind of acquaintance with the 
objects in our surroundings. Moreover, perception and action are usually ‘intertwined’ to such 
an extent that they form a unified sort of experience – ‘perception-cum-action’. In unfolding 
what he takes to be the complex phenomenological and intentional structure of this kind of 
experience, Smith suggests that acquaintance with the familiar features in our surroundings 
should be understood in the ‘embodied’ terms first laid down by Husserl and by Merleau-
Ponty, which have more recently inspired theorists such as Varela, Thompson & Rosch 
(1991), Gallagher (2006, 2017) or Noe (2004, 2012). 
 This tradition of embodied and enactivist approaches to experience is also an 
important inspiration for Jonathan Knowles’s contribution to this volume. Knowles takes 
as his point of departure the recent debate between John Campbell and Quassim Cassam 
(2014) over the relative explanatory merits of an acquaintance-based, ‘relational’ account of 
experience vs. a representational account. He argues that Campbell’s acquaintance-based 
view is correct to insist that the phenomenal character of sensory experience is (at least 
partially) constituted by the external objects and features that we perceive. However, Knowles 
argues that the relational view does not sufficiently acknowledge the subject’s contribution to 
phenomenal character of experience. He thus advances what he takes to be a superior 
alternative theory, ‘Phenomenological Externalism’, according to which the objects and 
features that we are directly presented with in perceptual experience are part of a ‘world-for-
me’ or ‘world-for-us’. Knowles’s theory is thus appealing to something like the idea of an 
‘Umwelt’ – a term that was due originally to the German biologist Jakob von Uexküll, and 
which was an important influence on Husserl’s notion of a Lifeworld (Lebenswelt). 
Knowles’s essay provides an extended discussion of how such a ‘world of experience’ relates 
to the world as described by our best physical sciences. 
 Anders Nes’s essay in this volume also engages closely with the work of John 
Campbell as well as with the work of John McDowell. Whilst McDowell can be classified as 
a kind of disjunctivist about perceptual experience, insisting as he does that in ‘good cases’ of 
normal perceptual experience we are ‘open to the world’ (McDowell 1994, 111), he does not 
treat this direct perceptual awareness of our surroundings as a relation of acquaintance. This 
is because McDowell, following in the footsteps of Sellars and of Kant, insists that perceptual 
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experience itself must already involve the operation of conceptual capacities if it is to be a 
source of knowledge and justified belief. Whereas acquaintance is supposed precisely to 
contrast with the sort of thoughts and attitudes that employ concepts. However, Nes suggests 
that there can be significant convergence between the acquaintance-based, relational position 
of Campbell and the conceptualist position of McDowell if we consider the crucial role, for 
Campbell, of conscious attention. Nes argues that attention should be considered a conceptual 
capacity, in the sense relevant for McDowell’s purposes, and thus claims that many of the 
reasons Campbell provides to favour the relational account can be recast in conceptualist-
friendly terms. 
 
5.3 Acquaintance & Reference 
 There is a widely (though not universally) accepted distinction between singular or de 
re thoughts and descriptive or de dicto thoughts. The core intuition behind this distinction is 
that one way of forming a thought about a particular object is by thinking of some descriptive 
condition which that object (uniquely) satisfies. E.g. I may form a thought whose content 
includes the descriptive condition: the current heaviest sumo wrestler, and by doing so my 
thought will be about the particular individual (assuming there is one) who in fact uniquely 
satisfies this condition – in this case, the Mongolian rikishi Ichinojo Takashi. But it seems 
that at least sometimes one can think about a particular object in a more direct way – that is, 
not via the satisfaction of some descriptive, conceptual condition but simply as that thing. 
Granting that such direct, singular reference is sometimes possible, it is often assumed that 
the item itself would then figure in the propositional content of the thought, in contrast to the 
general, quantificational structure of a merely descriptive content. 
 There is then a question concerning the conditions under which one can make 
singular reference to something and here it is often claimed that some kind of acquaintance 
relation with the item in question is required (at least by somebody, somewhere, at some 
time); though there is a whole spectrum of views on what counts as acquaintance, and there 
are also those who deny that acquaintance is a necessary condition on singular reference at 
all. (Jeshion 2010, Hawthorne & Manley 2012) 
 For example, Imogen Dickie (2010) has defined acquaintance as follows: 
 
“A subject, S, is ‘acquainted’ with an object, o, iff S is in a position to think about o in 
virtue of a perceptual link with o and without the use of any conceptual or descriptive 
intermediary.” (Dickie, 2010, 213) 
 
Dickie then goes on to argue that we can be acquainted with familiar physical objects in our 
environment, as opposed to the idea that we can only be acquainted with mental items such as 
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‘sense-data’. Francois Recanati (2010) takes a slightly different approach, arguing that 
acquaintance is a not a strictly necessary condition on singular thought, but rather that 
acquaintance with a specific object is a normative /functional standard or constraint on 
singular thought – i.e. singular thoughts ought to be tokened on the basis of acquaintance with 
the referent for this is their proper purpose or functional role. 
 In her contribution to the present volume, Jessica Pepp argues that we should 
distinguish more carefully between the claim that acquaintance is a necessary condition for a 
thought to have singular propositional content and the claim that acquaintance is a necessary 
condition for a thought to be about its object in a direct, ‘non-satisfactional’ way. Pepp 
suggests that these two conditions can come apart and so even if it is false that acquaintance 
is required for singular propositional content, it might yet be true that acquaintance is required 
in order to think about an item in this special non-satisfactional manner 
 Another, related way in which acquaintance has been thought to be important to 
reference is to allow for ostensive definitions of concepts/terms and so avoid a regress (or 
loop) of merely verbal definitions. If we accept that at least some concepts are not to be 
defined in terms of other concepts, then it seems we will need some other kind of non-
conceptual relation to the referent. It is very natural to think that acquaintance with the 
referent would be ideally suited to play this kind of role – see both Fumerton’s and Levine’s 
contributions to this volume for further discussion. 
 This sort of concern about the ultimate basis for our grasp of reference was an 
important motivation for John Campbell’s Reference and Consciousness (2002), a book 
which played a seminal role in re-establishing the notion of acquaintance as part of the 
mainstream conversation in analytic philosophy. Campbell famously argued that a non-
conceptual, non-representational conscious relation to our surroundings – i.e. acquaintance – 
is required to ground our knowledge of the reference of our concepts, especially our basic 
demonstrative concepts. In later work, Campbell (2002a, 2005, 2009, 2011, Campbell & 
Cassam 2014) has emphasized that conscious acquaintance with the external world is required 
in order to answer what he calls ‘Berkeley’s Puzzle’: 
 
‘Berkeley is trying to respect a principle about the relation between experience and 
concepts that is both important and difficult to keep in place. This is what I will call the 
explanatory role of experience. The principle is that concepts of individual physical 
objects, and concepts of the observable characteristics of such objects, are made 
available by our experience of the world. It is experience of the world that explains our 
grasp of these concepts. The puzzle that Berkeley is addressing is that is hard to see how 
our concepts of mind-independent objects could have been made available by 
experience of them.’ (Campbell, 2002a) 
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Campbell’s claim is that experience cannot play the explanatory role we require of it – viz., 
giving us a conception of a mind-independent world of objects – unless we treat experience as 
a non-representational relation of acquaintance. In other words acquaintance is supposedly 
required to explain how it is we can even think about the mind-independent external features 
of the world, let alone know anything about them. (See Cassam 2011, Campbell & Cassam 
2014, Rey 2005 and Jonathan Knowles’ essay in this volume for critical responses to 
Campbell.) 
 Another concern that was already present in Reference and Consciousness was to 
understand our grasp not only of our own perceptually-based demonstratives, but also other 
people’s perceptual demonstratives. And so we must consider cases of joint attention by two 
different subjects to the same object. Campbell’s suggestion was that the nature of one’s 
experience in such cases of joint attention is fundamentally different from cases of solitary 
perceptual attention – indeed Campbell claimed we should take a ‘relational view’ of joint 
attention: 
 
‘Just as the object you see can be a constituent of your experience, so too it can be a 
constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending to the 
object.” (Campbell, 2002b, 161) 
 
In his contribution to the present volume John Campbell revisits his argument for treating 
experiences of joint attention as ‘primitive’. Drawing on empirical work by Michael 
Tomasello, Campbell argues that the sort of acquaintance with external objects that is 
required for a grasp of reference, and hence for communication, is grounded in very basic 
joint-attentional activities that we engage in with our parents or caregivers in early infancy. 
Campbell thus hopes to effect a rapprochement between the Wittgensteinian idea that shared, 
public language is explanatorily prior to gaining full-blown propositional attitudes and the 
core idea of Reference and Consciousness that it is perceptual acquaintance with objects and 
features in our environment that explains our grasp of reference. 
 
5.4 Acquaintance & Epistemology 
 Russell employed the notion of acquaintance as part of the project of foundationalist 
epistemology which he saw himself as pursuing. One of the most ancient epistemological 
dialectics is a concern with a potential regress of justifications – sometimes called ‘Agrippa’s 
Trilemma’. Our beliefs stand in inferential relations (or at rather the contents of those beliefs 
do). When the content of one belief entails the content of another, any justification for the 
first belief is ‘transmitted’ to the second. (Likewise when the relation is not full entailment 
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but just probability raising, justification can be partially transmitted or bestowed . . .). But 
while inferential relations can transmit justification it is not at all obvious, despite what 
coherentists may claim, how they could create justification in the 1st place. An inferential 
chain or structure could go around in a circle (or some more complicated web-like structure), 
it could perhaps extend infinitely, or it can have a terminus – a belief that is not justified via 
inferential relations. A foundationalist holds that there are such terminal nodes, which are 
nevertheless justified non-inferentially. Some foundationalists in the past held that these 
nodes were self-justifying. But the more normal foundational position, these days, is that 
these terminal nodes are non-inferentially justified by something that is not a belief – viz, an 
experience. If the experience is to provide a reason for belief that is not itself just a further 
belief (not just another premise in a potential inference), then the experience must somehow 
make something available to the subject in a way that is different from just having another 
belief. And then one way to cash this out is that the subject is consciously acquainted with 
something – where this episode of acquaintance can provide a reason for believing that p but 
not by playing the role of a premise in an inference whose conclusion is p. Rather, the 
experience is held to present or reveal the very things, the truth-makers, that the belief that p 
is about (see Raleigh 2017 for further discussion of such non-inferential justification). 
 Recent theorists who have explicitly revived this traditional form of acquaintance-
based foundationalism include: Moser (1989), Fumerton (1995, 2001), Bonjour (2003), Fales 
(1996), Hassan (2011, 2013). In a similar vein, acquaintance has been appealed to in 
epistemological discussions of self-knowledge, where it might be supposed to explain or 
account for the distinctively secure status of knowledge of our mental states gained via 
introspection. E.g. Brie Gertler (2011, 2012) has based her account of first person privileged 
knowledge on the idea that we are acquainted with our own conscious mental states. This 
revival of traditional, acquaintance-based foundationalism has faced various criticisms. For 
example: Poston (2010) and Huemer (2007) argue that acquaintance cannot allow for fallibly 
justified foundational beliefs. (See Fumerton 2010, Hassan 2013 for pro-acquantaince 
responses.) Whilst Sosa (2003), Poston (2007) and Markie (2009) suggest that ‘speckled hen 
cases’12 pose a problem for an acquaintance-based theories of justification. (See Bonjour 
2003, Fumerton 2005 for responses.) 
 In Richard Fumerton’s essay for this volume, he continues to pursue his own 
internalist foundational project in epistemology, a project that he explicitly connects with 
Descartes’ employment of the ‘method of doubt’ to search for secure foundations for our 
beliefs. Fumerton holds not only that we can be acquainted with conscious mental states of 
affairs (facts) and with propositional contents (thoughts) but also with the correspondence 
                                                      
12 The example of a speckled hen is presented by Chisholm (1942), though Chisholm credits the idea 
to Gilbert Ryle.	
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that can obtain between the fact and the thought such that the former is the truthmaker for the 
latter. Fumerton claims that when we are acquainted with all three of these factors we would 
have “strong or ideal” justification for believing the proposition in question. Fumerton argues 
that such an account can deal with familiar ‘speckled hen’ type objections by denying that we 
have genuine direct acquaintance with one or other of these three factors (fact, thought, or the 
correspondence between them). He also argues that acquaintance can provide a unified 
account of both empirical and a priori justification. 
 To be clear – one does not have to be an acquaintance theorist in order to accept that 
there is non-inferential justification or in order to be a foundationalist. For example: Jim 
Pryor (2000) has influentially argued in favour of the non-inferential justification of beliefs 
by experience, but he does not make any sort of appeal to acquaintance (though he does think 
that it is the distinctively ‘presentational’ phenomenology of perceptual experience which 
allows it to provide defeasible, non-inferential justification for belief). More generally, one 
could, prima facie, be a thoroughgoing representational theorist about experience, eschewing 
all talk of acquaintance, and still maintain that a contentful, representational experience can 
stand in a justificatory relation to a belief that is not an inferential relation.  
 A different kind of epistemic project for acquaintance, distinct from the 
foundationalist project sketched above, is to explain how it is possible for us to gain 
knowledge of the intrinsic, categorical nature of external mind-independent features – as 
opposed to knowing merely that some or other intrinsic/categorical feature occupies a certain 
position or role within a relational, theoretical structure. This ‘revelatory’ function for 
acquaintance has in recent years been championed both by John Campbell (1993, 2005) and 
Bill Brewer (2011)13. They have argued that acquaintance with the external world allows us to 
avoid the sort of epistemic ‘Humility’ about the intrinsic nature of the external world that Rae 
Langton (1998) and David Lewis (2009) suggested we are bound to be limited to – a position 
that is very similar to epistemic structural realism in the philosophy of science (see, for 
example, Maxwell 1968, Worrall 1989 – though it is arguable that Russell was already 
endorsing something like structural realism in Problems of Philosophy). In his contribution 
to the present volume, Bill Brewer argues that only an acquaintance-based account of visual 
experience can explain such an experience’s ability to be a source of knowledge about the 
intrinsic/categorical nature of mind-independent properties – e.g. a source of knowledge 
about what it is for something to be round or square, red or blue etc. Brewer argues that two 
main rival theories, resemblance-based or representational accounts, cannot account for how 
experience can be a source of such knowledge. And so to the extent that we wish to avoid 
embracing Humility and accept that experience is indeed a source of such ‘revelatory’ 
                                                      
13 See also Dasgupta (2015) for another important recent work that appeals to the revelatory function 
of acquaintance.	
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knowledge about the external world’s intrinsic nature, we have reason to embrace an 
acquaintance-based theory of experience. 
 A rather more specific epistemological topic in which acquaintance has recently 
figured concerns aesthetic knowledge and judgement. Richard Wollheim (1980) proposed an 
acquaintance principle according to which it is impossible to gain certain kinds of aesthetic 
knowledge about O unless one is acquainted with O itself: ‘judgments of aesthetic value... 
must be based on first-hand experience of their objects’ (Wollheim , 1980, 233). A number of 
theorists have argued that Wollheim’s formulation is too strong for it would rule out making 
judgements about a work’s aesthetic value based on a reproduction or photograph (see e.g. 
Livingston 2003, Hopkns 2006). Nevertheless, many philosophers have maintained that 
Wollheim’s acquaintance principle points to something correct about aesthetic judgement and 
have tried to provide improved reformulations – see e.g. Budd (2003), Todd (2004), 
Konigsberg (2012), Robson (2013, 2017), Sauchelli (2016) for further discussion. 
 It is commonplace to draw a distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how –
 i.e. between factual and practical knowledge. Acquaintance raises the prospect that there may 
be a third important kind of knowledge, which we might call objectual knowledge. We will 
then naturally wonder whether one or other of these kinds of knowledge reduces to or 
depends on one of the others. In the case of knowing-that and knowing-how, this question has 
generated a very large literature (see Stanley & Williamson 2001, Stanley 2010 for recent 
influential discussion; see Fantl 2009 for a useful survey article). And as mentioned already, 
in section 3 above, Russell held that knowledge of an object by acquaintance was a 
fundamentally different kind of knowledge, to knowing a truth about an object – indeed 
Russell held that knowledge-by-acquaintance was the more fundamental kind.  Katalin 
Farkas, in her contribution to this volume, considers whether objectual knowledge forms a 
genuine, irreducibly distinct kind of knowledge. Farkas argues that our everyday, natural 
language talk of ‘knowing things’ does not express such a distinctive kind of objectual 
knowledge with its own special, uniform nature. Indeed, Farkas suggests that at least some of 
our familiar talk of ‘knowing things’ refers to relations that should not be classified as 
knowledge at all. However, Farkas concludes that a distinctively philosophical notion of 
acquaintance with one’s own conscious experience might allow us to carve out a narrower but 
genuinely unified, sui generis category of objectual knowledge. 
 
****** 
 
 Whilst the foregoing survey of recent acquaintance-based theorising has by no means 
been exhaustive, I hope that it will, like the essays gathered here, provide a sense of the rich 
variety of topics for which the notion of acquaintance is currently being employed. 
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